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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

This is an appeal in two criminal cases which were consolidated for trial and
on appeal. This Court should vacate the convictions and remand for a new trial
because the court abused its discretion by excluding critical defense evidence.
B. Procedural History and Statement ofFacts

1. Pret ·ial proceedings
In 2012, Nicholas Longee was found guilty of grand theft by possession of
stolen property, unlawful possession of a firearm, solicitation of grand theft by
disposing of stolen property, and being a persistent violator in Twin Falls Co. No.
CR-2012-4905. R 8. On appeal the convictions were affirmed, but the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement was vacated for insufficient proof and the matter
was remanded. State v. Longee, No. 40436 (unreported), 2014 Ida. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 79, 2014 WL 587054 (Ct. App. 2014). Mr. Longee then filed a postconviction petition and obtained a new trial on the substantive counts. R 28.
The state then filed a new criminal case charging Mr. Longee with the
burglary of the home containing the items referenced in the 2012 case. Twin Falls
Co. No. CR42-15-9199. R 583-4. The state also filed a persistent violator
sentencing enhancement. R 711. The two cases were consolidated for trial. R 705.
2. The trial
Stanley Tharp's house was broken into sometime during March of 2012. T
pg. 159. Guns, jewelry, and a pillowcase were taken. T pg. 222, ln. 22 - pg. 226, ln.
1

15; Exhibit 22; T pg. 176, ln. 13·15.
The evidence linking Mr. Longee to the burglary and stolen property came
mainly from prison inmates. The defense theory of the case was that these soon·to·
be inmates committed the burglary, one of them was hounded by his girlfriend into
getting rid of the stolen guns, and they were now pointing the finger at Mr. Longee.
Mr. Longee testified at the first trial 1 that he was looking to buy car speakers
and his friend, Kenneth Worth, told him Omar Padilla had some for sale. Mr. Worth
drove him to meet Mr. Padilla at Ashton Jones's house. Mr. Padilla said that he
had some car speakers for sale but they would have to go pick them up. Mr. Padilla
also said that he didn't want his girlfriend, Ms. Jones, to know what was going on.
Ms. Jones then drove Mr. Padilla and Mr. Longee to Filer. Instead of picking up
speakers, Mr. Padilla signaled for Ms. Jones to stop the car near a ditch. Mr.
Padilla pointed to a pillow case with speaker-like boxes inside and asked Mr.
Longee to pick it up. He did so and put the pillowcase in the car trunk. Ms. Jones
drove back into town and stopped near Mr. Longee's home. Ms. Jones popped the
trunk open. Mr. Padilla and Mr. Longee went back to look. Mr. Padilla took guns
out of the boxes and showed them to Mr. Longee. Mr. Padilla indicated that he
didn't want Ms. Jones to know about the guns. Mr. Padilla asked Mr. Longee to
hold the guns for him. Mr. Longee refused. T pg. 446, ln. 8 · pg. 450, ln. 15; pg.

1

Mr. Longee did not testify at the trial, but portions of his testimony from
the first trial were testified to by Deputy John Koenig. A transcript of his
testimony in State v. Longee, supra, appears at R 494·496 of this record.
2

456, ln. 1 - pg. 462, ln. 22.
Mr. Padilla was in prison for aggravated assault and grand theft at the time
of the second trial, but on probation at the time of the events. He testified to the
same events as Mr. Longee, but reversed the roles. He said that Mr. Longee
telephoned and asked if he wanted to buy some "thumpers," which he took to mean
car speakers. T pg. 292, ln. 18-21.
Inmate Kenneth Worth asserted his right to remain silent at this trial, so his
testimony from the first trial was read to the jury. T pg. 245. At the time of the first
trial, Mr. Worth was facing a charge of Grand Theft by Possession of Stolen
Property. He cut a deal with the prosecutor for a probation recommendation in
exchange for his testimony against Mr. Longee. T pg. 489, ln. 12 · pg. 491, ln. 16;
Defendant's Exhibit 6. Pursuant to that deal, Mr. Worth testified that Mr. Longee
telephoned and asked ifhe knew of anyone who wanted to buy some guns. Mr.
Worth claimed that Mr. Longee said that he had gotten the guns from some house
in the country and they were hidden in a pillowcase in a ditch. T pg. 250, ln. 17·24.
Mr. Worth said that he agreed to drive Mr. Longee to Omar Padilla's house. T pg.
252, ln. 9· 12.
According to Mr. Padilla's testimony, after Mr. Worth dropped Mr. Longee
off, Mr. Padilla's girlfriend, Ashtyn Jones, drove them to Filer. T pg. 296, ln. 18·19.
On there way, Mr. Longee told them to stop the car, got out, grabbed a sack out of a
ditch, and put it in the trunk of the car. T pg. 305, ln. 14-20. When they got back to
Twin Falls, Mr. Longee showed the guns to Mr. Padilla. T pg. 308, ln. 3-5. He took
3

the guns from Mr. Longee pretending to agree to sell them for him. T pg. 312, ln.
20·25. Mr. Padilla later turned the guns over to an off-duty police officer, said they
came from Nick, but claimed he didn't know Nick's last name. T pg. 317, ln. 22 - pg.
318, ln. 15. The homeowner identified the recovered guns as his. T pg. 225, ln. 10·
24; Exhibits 13·19; 29. Ms. Jones backed up much of Mr. Padilla's story. T pg. 378394. She said that she did not know what was in the pillowcase until they returned
to Twin Falls. T pg. 398, ln. 2· 13.
Mr. Worth also testified that Mr. Longee called him and said that Mr. Padilla
"burnt him out of the money ... [flor the guns." T pg. 253, ln. 8·11.
Mr. Longee's fingerprints were not on the guns. T pg. 443, ln. 7·12.
A pawnshop owner testified that Mr. Worth pawned the stolen jewelry. T pg.
435, In. 2·20. Mr. Padilla's prison cellmate, Michael Davis, said Mr. Padilla claimed
he had to testify against Mr. Longee and that he was falsely blaming Mr. Longee so
his girlfriend wouldn't leave him. T pg. 513, In. 20·25.
Mr. Padilla showed three revolvers to Christopher LeBlanc on March 5, 2012,
the month of the burglary. T pg. 533 - In. 24 - pg. 535, In. 5. Mr. LeBlanc recalled
that date because it was his brother's birthday. T pg. 536, ln. 7.
Mr. Padilla told Daniel Ramey that he had five handguns that he was trying
to sell to Mr. Longee. Before he could do so, he got scared that Mr. Longee might
turn him in so he went to the police. T pg. 559, ln. 20 - pg. 560, ln. 4. Mr. Padilla
told a variation of that story to Don Gurley. He said that Ms. Jones found out that
he had the guns and that she was going to leave him if he didn't turn the guns in. T
4

pg. 586, ln. 13-20. Gary Simpson also heard Mr. Padilla say this. T pg. 624, ln. 1524.
The jury found Mr. Longee guilty of all counts and also found that he was a
persistent violator. R 444-46.
3. The sentencing
A judgment was entered in each case and Notice of Appeals were timely filed .
R 516, 530; 1053, 1066.
III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the court abuse its discretion when it excluded inculpatory statements
made by Kenneth Worth?
IV. ARGUMENT

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Excluding the P1·offered Evidence
Regarding Statements Made by Kenneth Worth

A. Pertinent Facts
Jason Ward was called to testify that Kenneth Worth admitted that he and
Mr. Padilla had committed the burglary and that Mr. Padilla ended up with the
guns. T pg. 549, In. 5 - pg. 550, In. 1 I; Defendant's Exhibit 7. The state objected
pursuant to I.RE. 804(b)(3). T pg. 550, In. 12 - pg. 552 ln. 1. The court sustained
the objection finding insufficient corroborating circumstances. T pg. 553, ln. 12-14.
Later, Don Gurley was called to testify that Mr. Worth told him that he "had to go
along with Omar after he blamed it on Nick because the cat's out of the bag" and
that Mr. Padilla had taken the guns. Mr. Worth admitted, "Those were ours [guns],
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and we took them." T pg. 595, In. 10-23. The state objected on the same basis and
the court sustained the objection finding "insufficjent corroborating circumstances
to give this a likelihood of reliability," without further explanation. T pg. 596, In. 6
- pg. 597, In. 25.
Mr. Longee then argued the evidence should be admitted under the Sixth
Amendment right to present evidence. T pg. 599, In. 22-25. The court permitted
Mr. Longee to reargue the issue after counsel had a chance to conduct further legal
research. T pg. 601, In. 7·12. Mr. Longee later argued that he had a Sixth
Amendment right to present the evidence under Chambers v. Mis

,j

s.ippi, 410 U.S.

284 (1973); and the evidence was admissible under I.R.E. 803 and State v. Meiste1·,
148 Idaho 236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009). T pg. 638, In. 7 - pg. 643, In. 18. The court
adhered to its prior ruling noting that while "it is a close point," it did not see the
"clearly corroborating circumstances." T pg. 647, ln. 2·7.
B. The Court Abused its Discretion

A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to present a defense,
including the right to present the defendant's version of the facts. State v. Thomas,
157 Idaho 916, 342 P.3d 628, 631 (2015). The right to present evidence is grounded
in the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S.
400, 409 (1988); State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 846, 979 P.2d 1201, 1204 (1999).
"The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to
a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations." Chambers v.
Jvfissi sippi, 410 U.S. at 294. "This right is a fundamental element of due process of
6

law." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967).
On review of a discretionary decision on appeal, "this Court must consider
whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its
decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 491, 337 P.3d 647,
650 (2014), quoting Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139
Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 (2004). Here, the court did not act consistently
with the legal standards applicable to it.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(b)(3) permits the admission of hearsay when the
declarant is unavailable as a witness if it is:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a
claim by declarant against another, that a reasonable man in
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless
declarant believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered in a criminal case is not
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.
A judge's inquiry regarding the corroboration requirement of the rule '"should
be limited to asking whether evidence in the record corroborating and contradicting
the declarant's statement would permit a reasonable person to believe that the
statement could be true.' This will protect the province of the jury as the fact-finder
and prevent the judge from 'be[ing] able to bootstrap himself [or herself] into the
jury box via evidentiary rules.'" State v. Meister, 148 Idaho at 242, 220 P.3d at
7

1061, quoting State v. LaG1·and, 734 P.2d 563, 570 (Ariz. 1987) (internal citations
omitted). In doing so, the court should consider the following factors: (1) whether
the declarant is unavailable; (2) whether the statement is against the declarant's
interest; (3) whether corroborating circumstances exist which clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the exculpatory statement, taking into account contradictory
evidence, the relationship between the declarant and the listener, and the
relationship between the declarant and the defendant; (4) whether the declarant
has issued the statement multiple times; (5) whether a significant amount of time
has passed between the incident and the statement; (6) whether the declarant will
benefit from making the statement; and (7) whether the psychological and physical
surroundings could affect the statement. State v. Meister, 148 Idaho at 238, 220
P.3d at 1057.
In Meister, the Court vacated the conviction because "[t]he district court
erred by applying the wrong standard for admissibility of alternate perpetrator
evidence, and therefore, abused its discretion." State v. Meister, 148 Idaho at 241,
220 P.3d at 1060. The same is true here. The trial court did not apply all the

Meister factors and erroneously applied the one it focused on. While the court
recognized Mr. Worth was unavailable, it then focused exclusively on factor three,
neglecting factors two and four-seven. Further, the court did not limit itself to
asking whether evidence in the record corroborating and contradicting the
declarant's statement would permit a reasonable person to believe that the
statement could be true. Instead, it concerned itself with whether it believed the
8

statements were true, thus invading the province of the jury as fact-finder.
Consequently, a new trial should be granted.
C. The Evidence is Admissible Under Meister.

Application of the Meister factors shows the evidence should have been
admitted.
1. Mr. Worth was unavailable

Mr. Worth was unavailable because he asserted his right against selfincrimination. T pg. 553, ln. 3-11.
2. The statements are agains t Mr. vVorth's interest
Mr. Worth's statement to Mr. Ward that he and Mr. Padilla had committed
the burglary and that Mr. Padilla ended up with the guns is against Mr. Worth's
penal interests for two reasons. First, it is an admission that he is guilty of
burglary, theft, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. It is also an admission
that he conspired with Mr. Padilla to commit all the above crimes. The same is true
for his statement to Mr. Gurley that "Those [guns] were ours, and we took them."
(T pg. 595, ln. 10-23.)

Second, since both statements are inconsistent with his prior trial testimony,
they put him at risk for a perjury charge for falsely testifying against Mr. Longee at
the first trial. Mr. Worth's statement that he "had to go along with Omar after he
blamed it on Nick because the cat's out of the bag" is also an admission that he
perjured himself during the first trial.
3. Wheth er corroborating circumstanc sexist which dearly indicate th >
9

trustworthiness of the exculpatorv statement
The statements by Mr. Worth to different people cross-corroborate each other.
In addition, they are consistent with the testimony that Mr. Worth was caught
pawning the stolen jewelry.
The undisputed fact that Mr. Padilla was in possession of the stolen weapons
corroborates Mr. Worth's statements that he and Mr. Padilla stole them. The
statements are also corroborated by Mr. LeBlanc's testimony that Mr. Padilla
showed him the guns on March 5, 2012. T pg. 533 - ln. 24 - pg. 535, In. 5. Mr.
Worth's statements are also corroborated by Mr. Padilla's own statements to Mr.
Ramey, Mr. Gurley, and Mr. Simpson about the guns and why he had to blame Mr.
Longee. See T pg. 559, ln. 20 - pg. 560, In. 4 (Ramey testimony); T pg. 586, In. 13·20
(Gurley testimony); T pg. 624, ln. 15-24 (Simpson testimony).
The contradictory evidence mainly comes from Mr. Worth and Mr. Padilla,
both of whom have made prior inconsistent statements and had an obvious motive
to lie. Mr. Padilla's girlfriend, Ms. Jones, also had a motive to support him and lie
about Mr. Longee.
There is nothing in the relationship between Mr. Worth and the defense
witnesses (Mr. Gurley and Mr. Ward) that would suggest the testimony was not
reliable. Likewise, the relationship between Mr. Worth and Mr. Longee does not
affect the believability of the statements. Mr. Worth was friends with both Mr.
Padilla and Mr. Longee. There was no reason to favor one of the other until, as Mr.
Worth explained, Mr. Padilla let the "cat out of the bag" by turning the guns over to
10

the police. After that, he had to back up Mr. Padilla in order to protect himself from
prosecution. Moreover, the statements were made after all three of them had been
convicted of various crimes and were in prison.
Thus, taking into account the contradictory evidence, the relationship
between Mr. Worth and the witnesses, and the relationship between Mr. Worth and
Mr. Longee, as required by Meister, there was sufficient corroboration for a jury to
believe those statements.
4. Mr. Worth has made the statement multiple times
Mr. Worth made the statements to two different people at different times.
This factor favors admission.
5. A ·ignificant .: mount of time has not paRsed between the incident and the
statement
The burglary occurred in March of 2012. The statements to Mr. Ward were
made near October of 2014. Defendant's Exhibit 7. It is not clear when the
statements to Mr. Gurley were made, but it is clear from the context that it was
after Mr. Longee's first trial in the 2012 case because there is a reference to the
trial transcripts. T pg. 592, ln. 25. Defense counsel told the court that the
statements were made "sometime in 2014 and 2015." T pg. 642, ln. 23.
6. Mr. Worth will not benefit from making Lhe statement
There is no benefit for Mr. Worth to admit that he and Mr. Padilla committed
the crime, other than to clear his conscious regarding his false testimony at the first
trial. If anything, Mr. Worth stood to gain by testifying against Mr. Longee for a
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second time because only the state could assist him with his sentence or parole
prospects. The fact he refused to testify at the second trial lends credibility to his
statements that he and Mr. Padilla were responsible for the crimes.
7. The psychological and physical surroundings could not affect the
statement
To the extent that Mr. Worth would not want to be known to be snitching
against Mr. Longee, that is equally true regarding Mr. Padilla. Thus, the fact that
the statements were made in prison does not effect their believability. Mr. Worth
would not lie about he and Mr. Padilla committing the crime to avoid informing on
Mr. Longee because doing so requires him to inform on Mr. Padilla. He would have
taken sole responsibility if he only wanted to avoid being known as an informer
against Mr. Longee.
8. Conclusion
As shown above, the court abused its discretion because it did not act
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it. Instead of inquiring whether evidence in the record corroborating and
contradicting Mr. Worth's statement would permit a reasonable person to believe
that the statement could be true, it mechanistically focused on just one of the seven

Meister factors. Had the district court considered all the Meister factors, it would
have admitted the statements.
D. The State Cannot Show the Error Is Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Here the jury had the choice of believing Mr. Longee committed the burglary
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and tried to sell the guns to Mr. Padilla or believing that Mr. Padilla and Mr. Worth
committed the burglary and were trying to blame Mr. Lougee. The excluded
testimony that Mr. Worth admitted committing the burglary with Mr. Padilla
would have tipped the scales toward acquittal. Consequently, the state cannot meet
its burden of proving the objected-to error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
as required by State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).

V. CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Mr. Lougee asks the Court to vacate his conviction and
remand for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of August, 2017.

Isl Dennis Benj a min
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Appellant

13

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE
The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief submitted is in
compliance with all of the requirements set out in I.A.R. 34.1, and that an electronic
copy was served on each party at the following email address(es): Idaho State
Attorney General, Criminal Law Division
cf@ag.idaho.gov
Dated and certified this 24th day of August, 2017.

ls/Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin

14

